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Abstract: Previous scholarship has explored whether the halakhah (Jewish law) of ona'ah (fraud) 
constitutes a price-control. However, less attention has been paid to the similar law of hayyei nefesh 
(essential foodstuffs) – also known as hafka'at she'arim (profiteering). Nor has criticism been directed 
towards arbitrary price-controls imposed by the corporate, democratic Jewish community. This essay 
argues that while ona'ah is not a price-control, hayyei nefesh / hafka'at she'arim is one. Economic 
theory demonstrates that like all price-controls, hayyei nefesh / hafka'at she'arim and corporate 
communal price-controls are both self-defeating because the means conflict with the ends sought. The 
conflict between religion and science is therefore not limited to cosmology and biology, but may 
include economics as well.
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It is almost universally accepted among economists today that price-controls are almost always 
self-defeating, accomplishing the opposite of their intention, and generally producing perverse, 
undesirable consequences. Concerning price-controls both ancient (Schuettinger and Butler 1979) and 
modern (Coyne and Coyne 2015a), the consensus is nearly unanimous that price-controls simply do not 
work (Morton 2001, Rockoff 2008).
But relatively little attention has been paid to price-controls in Jewish law (halakhah). This 
essay will examine three halakhot (pl.) in particular, viz.: (1) ona'ah (fraud); (2) hayyei nefesh 
(“essential foodstuffs”) – also called hafka'at she'arim (“profiteering”); and (3) price-controls imposed 
arbitrarily by the corporate Jewish community. We shall see that on the one hand, ona'ah does not 
constitute a price-control at all, even though it superficially appears to be one. On the other hand, 
hayyei nefesh and the corporate communal controls do constitute forms of price-control. Furthermore, 
the typical, mainstream arguments against price-controls apply with full-force to these latter laws.
The fact that several Jewish laws are open to positive (value-free) scientific criticism by 
economists poses an obvious dilemma for the Orthodox or traditionally observant Jew. It is 
conventional to accept the possibility of conflict between religion and cosmology and biology 
(evolution),1 but it is not usually realized that a similar conflict can exist between religion and 
economic science. Because hayyei nefesh and the communal controls are forms of price-control, and 
because economic science demonstrates price-controls to be generally self-defeating, therefore, we 
shall see that religion and positive science may conflict not only in the realm of cosmology or biology, 
but even in the field of economics and public policy as well. We will suggest several possible means of 
reconciling this conflict.
We will analyze Jewish law as a single, continuous whole, considering the Roman-era Mishnah, 
the Sassanid-era Talmud, and the Medieval codes of Jewish law as explaining each other. In other 
words, we are interested in what living Jewish law has to say for practical matters, rather than being 
concerned with what the historical Mishnah or Talmud meant. There is an important distinction to be 
drawn between the two approaches: on the one hand, one could isolate specific statements in the 
Mishnah or Talmud and situate them in their historical contexts according to the identities of their 
named-authors. On the other hand, one may consider Jewish literature as a continuous unity and study 
it in a relatively ahistorical fashion. Kleiman's study of ona'ah takes the historical approach and notes 
that other scholars have taken the unity approach (Kleiman 1987: 25 n. 2). This essay will take the 
unity approach, for our concern is not with what the specific authors of the Mishnah or Talmud meant 
as individuals, but instead with how living, evolving Jewish law has understood them.
This paper is organized as follows: section I summarizes the laws of ona'ah and hafka'at 
she'arim / hayyei nefesh, to establish the basic characteristics of these laws – but without subjecting 
them to any critical analysis. Section II similarly summarizes the communal price-controls without 
criticism. Section III critically evaluates ona'ah, determining that it does not constitute a price-control. 
Section IV does the same for hafka'at she'arim / hayyei nefesh, concluding that this law is a price-
control. Section V summarizes mainstream economic theory concerning price-controls in order to 
explain why it is so problematic that hafka'at she'arim / hayyei nefesh is a price-control, and why it is 
undesirable that the community possesses its own power to impose price-controls. Section VI is 
devoted to criticizing Aaron Levine's defense of the hafka'at she'arim / hayyei nefesh law. As Levine 
was both a rabbi as well as an academic economist, his own view is particularly noteworthy and 
deserving of in-depth evaluation. Section VII discusses whether these laws are still binding and 
authoritative for Jews today, and if so, what resolutions there may be for this dilemma. Section VIII 
concludes.
I. Ona'ah and Hayyei Nefesh (Hafka'at She'arim) Summarized2
Shilo defines ona'ah (“wrongdoing” or “harm”) as “the act of wronging another by selling him 
an article for more than its real worth or by purchasing from him an article for less than its real worth” 
(Shilo and Elon 2008). Similarly, Kleiman (1987: 25) defines ona'ah as “exploitation through price 
deceit.” Ona'ah is based on an interpretation of the verse in Leviticus 25:14, “And if thou sell aught 
unto thy neighbor, or buy of thy neighbor's hand, ye shall not wrong (tonu) one another.” The law of 
ona'ah prohibits the sale of a good where its price diverges from its “true” market price by one-sixth or 
more.3 Both under- and over-charging are equally prohibited.
Closely related to ona'ah is another law, variously referred to as hafka'at she'arim 
(“profiteering”) or hayyei nefesh (“life necessities”). Elon (2008) defines hafka'at she'arim as “raising 
the price of a commodity beyond the accepted level, or that fixed by a competent authority.”. Similarly, 
Warhaftig says (1987: sec. “1”) that “a profiteer is one who causes the prices to rise in an artificial 
manner” and that the halakhah restricts “someone who causes prices to rise without economic 
justification.” Like ona'ah, the law of hafka'at she'arim or hayyei nefesh prohibits sale where the price 
diverges one-sixth or more from the market price.
One crucial distinction between these two laws is that whereas ona'ah is a Biblical prohibition 
which may be waived in certain cases by the parties involved, hafka'at she'arim is a Rabbinic 
enactment (Elon 2008, Warhaftig 1988: s.v. “F. Fraud.”). Counter-intuitively, even though hafka'at 
she'arim is less authoritative than ona'ah – because it is merely Rabbinic in nature – nevertheless, only 
ona'ah may we waived with the consent of the two parties, whereas hafka'at she'arim may not be 
waived – not even with mutual consent. A second distinction is that the two laws apply to different 
classes of goods. Ona'ah applies to nearly all goods and commodities whatsoever, with the specific 
exceptions of real estate, slaves, financial instruments, and consecrated objects. By contrast, hafka'at 
she'arim applies only to essential foodstuffs.4 To summarize: ona'ah is a Biblical prohibition which 
prohibits certain degrees of over- or under-charging on all commodities except real estate, slaves, 
financial instruments, and consecrated objects, but the parties to the transaction may waive the 
prohibition with mutual consent. Hafka'at she'arim / hayyei nefesh, by contrast, is a Rabbinic 
prohibition which applies only to foodstuffs, and this prohibition cannot be waived – not even by the 
mutual consent of the parties.
Unfortunately, these two distinct laws are so closely related that they are often conflated in the 
literature, and it is necessary to carefully distinguish between them.5 Their close relationship is apparent 
from Maimonides's organization of Hil. Mekhira (“Laws of Trade”). In Hil. Mekhira chaps. 12 and 13, 
Maimonides discusses ona'ah. In the first two paragraphs of chap. 14, he turns to hafka'at she'arim. 
Then in 14:3-11, Maimonides discusses speculation, middlemen, hoarding, communal price-controls, 
and guilds. In the final paragraphs of chap. 14, i.e. par. 12-18, Maimonides returns to the topic of 
ona'ah. In other words, hafka'at she'arim is sandwiched in between two discussions of ona'ah, showing 
they are related. Tamari's 1991 presentation is similar: Tamari (1991: 68-72) first discusses hafka'at 
she'arim, then he turns (1991: 87) to ona'ah, and then he returns to hafka'at she'arim again (1991: 87f.), 
which this (second) time he confusingly refers to as “cost-related ona'ah.” Finally, he concludes with 
ordinary ona'ah again (1991: 88-91). Elsewhere, Tamari (1987) seems to draw a sharper distinction, 
separating hafka'at she'arim (1987: 88-96) and ona'ah (1987: 96-100) into two separate discussions. 
But even then ,Tamari (1987) briefly lumps ona'ah and hafka'at she'arim together into one single 
statement, saying (1987: 88), “the forms of price control discussed here all refer to basic commodities 
or their ingredients [i.e., hafka'at she'arim], with investment goods (such as land, slaves, or monetary 
instruments) excluded [i.e. ona'ah].” Lew (1985) does not clearly distinguish between hafka'at 
she'arim and ona'ah, shifting seamlessly from discussing the former (Lew 1985: 42) to the latter (Lew 
1985: 43) without clearly distinguishing them. Warhaftig (1987) is mostly concerned with hafka'at 
she'arim while Warhaftig (1988) is mostly concerned with ona'ah, although the latter (Warhaftig 1988) 
returns to hafka'at she'arim near its conclusion (s.v. “F. Fraud, Profit Limitation, and Unfair Pressure”). 
Although Kleiman (1987) is predominately concerned with ona'ah, his brief allusion to hafka'at 
she'arim shows their close relationship: “The rather general, contrasting statement to the effect that 
profits (from trade?) should not exceed one-sixth (TB BB 90a), seems to have represented an attempt to 
interpret the ona'ah rules in an all-embracing manner” (Kleiman 1987: 36 n. 23).
With regard to both laws, it is not entirely clear whether whether the official price is publicly 
announced or whether market participants must research the price for themselves at their own expense. 
Warhaftig (1988: sec. “Introduction”) is equivocal, saying, “The correct price is officially set by the 
authorities or is the prevailing price in the marketplace.” Kleiman notes (1987: 26), “nowhere does the 
Talmud explicitly mention the reference price from which such a divergence is to be measured,” but he 
concludes (1987: 26) that “the relevant standard was none other than the going market price.” Levine 
(2012: 53) agrees with Kleiman, saying, “the reference price for an ona'ah claim is nothing other than 
the competitive norm.” Indeed, the halakhah specifies that the victim of ona'ah has only a limited time 
to object to the over- or under-charge, according to how long it is estimated it would take him to verify 
the proper price with an expert (Hil. Mekhira 12:5-11; Warhaftig 1988 s.v. “B. Period of Cancellation”; 
Kleiman 1987: 26; Tamari 1987: 97f.; Tamari 1991: 78; Weissman 1998: 86-88). This implies that there 
is no officially posted price which can be easily looked up on a public bulletin, but rather, that the law 
of ona'ah enforces whatever the market price may happen to be, and that a person must verify for 
himself what that price actually is (Kleiman 1987: 34 n. 19). So it may be that no fixed price was 
officially established at all, and instead, it was assumed that the market price would speak for itself. 
On the other hand, it appears that a definite price was publicly fixed for hayyei nefesh / hafka'at  
she'arim, with price inspectors circulating to judge conformance to this official price. Concerning this 
law, Maimonides (Hil. Mekhira 14:1) declares, “the beit din [i.e. rabbinical court] is obligated to fix 
prices,” which implies a publicly promulgated official price. Likewise, Levine says (2012: 93), “the 
hayyei nefesh edict required the Jewish court to appoint price commissioners to supervise the 
marketplace.” Therefore, it is possible that prices for the two laws were fixed in two entirely different 
manners, with the ona'ah price being something market participants must discover for themselves (cf. 
Hil. Mekhira 12:5-11), but the hafka'at she'arim / hayyei nefesh price being officially dictated and 
announced (cf. Hil. Mekhira 14:1). 
In any case, it is important to remember that these two laws, though similar in many ways, are 
nevertheless distinct. While they both prohibit sales where the price diverges from the “true” price by 
more than one-sixth – prohibiting both under- and over-charging – ona'ah is a Biblical prohibition 
which applies to all goods whatsoever – except for land, slaves, financial instruments, and consecrated 
objects – and which may be waived with mutual consent. Hayyei nefesh (or hafka'at she'arim) is a 
merely Rabbinic prohibition which applies only to foodstuffs, and it may not be waived, not even 
without mutual consent. It is not clear how the “true” price is made known, but it is possible that the 
ona'ah price was left to be discovered by market actors while the hayyei nefesh price was officially 
promulgated.
II. Corporate Communal Price-Controls Summarized
Entirely apart from the beit din (rabbinical court)'s authority to enforce ona'ah and hafka'at 
she'arim / hayyei nefesh, there is a wholly distinct power resting in the corporate, (relatively) 
democratic Jewish community (Epstein 1985: i-ii; Warhaftig 1987: s.v. “6. Price Fixing”; Levine 2012: 
202) to regulate wages and prices (Hil. Mekhira 14:9, quoted by Levine 2012: 108, 202; Lew 1985: 
126; Elon 2008). As Tamari notes (1991: 68), “the people of the city have the right to fix prices (either 
by majority vote for through their representatives)” (cf. Tamari 1987: 94). Warhaftig (1987 s.v. “6. 
Price Fixing”) quotes Tosefta BM 11:12: “The members of the community may determine prices and 
measures and wages, and they may enforce their decisions.” Similarly, Levine (2012: 108) quotes 
Maimonides, Hilkhot Mekhira 14:9 (cf. Tamari 1987: 94): 
The residents of the city may agree among themselves to fix a price for any article they 
desire, even for meat and bread, and to stipulate that they will inflict such-and-such 
penalty upon one who violates the agreement.
Crucially, Levine (2012: 108) comments on Hil. Mekhira 14:9, saying, “communal price-fixing 
legislation in the hayyei nefesh sector may conflict with the 20% profit rate the Beit Din [rabbinical 
court] of the town sets for this sector” in enforcing the original law of hayyei nefesh itself. In other 
words, the community may impose restrictions on hayyei nefesh (essential foodstuffs) which go beyond 
the basic 20% hayyei nefesh law enforced by the rabbinical court. This appears to be a straightforward, 
unambiguous power to impose wage and price controls even beyond any controls already imposed by 
the laws of ona'ah and hafka'at she'arim / hayyei nefesh. This power of price-control applies to wages 
and salaries as well. Thus, Tamari (1987: 149) quotes the Talmud, BB 8b: “The people of the city are 
permitted to regulate weights, prices, and the wages of workers. They also have the power to punish 
those who do not carry out their regulations.”
III. Ona'ah Evaluated
In a series of articles, Block (1986, 1990, 2002) has argued that ona'ah constitutes a form of 
price-control, and he has concluded that all of the typical positive economic criticisms of price-controls 
apply to ona'ah. Sharfman (2006) considers ona'ah to constitute a price-control as well. But several 
scholars have convincingly agued that ona'ah is not meant as a price-control at all. Instead, it is only a 
measure meant to protect market participants from ignorance and asymmetric information.6 While such 
a law may be open to various objections, it cannot be criticized as a form of price-control.
This interpretation of ona'ah is based on the fact that ona'ah may be waived with the mutual 
consent of the parties. While it is prohibited for two parties to a transaction to waive the prohibition of 
ona'ah per se, they may nevertheless effectively do so by disclosing and consenting to the price 
discrepancy itself. In other words, a stipulation to the effect that “I sell you this on condition that there 
is no accusation of ona'ah” is invalid, but it is permissible and effective to stipulate, “I am selling you 
this good worth $10 for $20” (Shilo and Elon 2008). The fact that ona'ah can be circumvented by full-
disclosure shows that ona'ah is not meant as a price-control but as a protection against asymmetric 
information (Kleiman 1987: 29; Weissman 1998: 90; Tamari 1991: 82, 1987: 96f., 1986: 408; 
Warhaftig 1988 s.v. “Introduction”, s.v. “A. Definition”, s.v. “D. Stipulation and Waiver”).
In addition, Weissman and Kleiman both note the existence of a rejected opinion that the law of 
ona'ah did not protect merchants, but only consumers, because merchants are experts concerning prices 
(Kleiman 1987: 28 and Weissman 1998:88f., both quoting TB BM 51a). Although this is not the 
accepted by the Talmud as the final law (cf. Hil. Mekhira 12:8), Kleiman and Weissman argue that even 
the rejected opinion reveals a consensus concerning the underlying purpose of the law, viz. to protect 
the weak and ignorant against exploitation by those with superior knowledge.
According to this interpretation, the law of ona'ah is not a price-control meant to ban deviations 
from a given price, but it is merely meant to ensure that market prices are formed under conditions of 
full information. According to Tamari (1987: 99), “the law of ona'ah would seem to require a public 
policy requiring full disclosure of the market prices of basic commodities.” Later, Tamari suggested 
(1991: 85) that “the law of ona'ah would … seem to require communal or government action in order 
to make information about market prices freely available to all.” This does not mean the law is immune 
to any objections whatsoever, but it does mean that ona'ah is not a price-control (contra Block 1986, 
1990, 2002).7
IV. Hafka'at She'arim / Hayyei Nefesh Evaluated
By contrast, however, the law of hafka'at she'arim / hayyei nefesh – the price-limitation on 
foodstuffs – is a price-control. This is because unlike ona'ah, the law of hafka'at she'arim cannot be 
waived, not even with the mutual consent of the two parties. As Warhaftig says (1988 s.v. “F. Fraud...”), 
“Profit limitation is an obligation not subject to change through stipulation or waiver, unlike ona'ah.” 
And in the words of Maimonides (Mishneh Torah, Hilkhot Mekhira 14:1, trans. Levine 2012: 102):
We have already explained that he who does business on trust (nosei be-emunah) and 
says “I make so much and so much profit” is not subject to the law of overreaching 
(ona'ah), and even if he says “I bought this article for a sela and am selling it to you for 
ten,” it is legitimate. Nevertheless, the court is obligated to regulate prices [lifsok ha-
she'arim] and appoint officers of the law, so that people at large will not be able to reap 
whatever profit they desire, but should earn a profit of only one-sixth [i.e. 20%].
Maimonides immediately proceeds to clarify that this only applies to essential foodstuffs (Hil. Mekhira 
14:2). According to Levine (2012: 104),
Maimonides conveys the notion that the price ceiling for hayyei nefesh items [i.e. 
essential foodstuffs covered by hafka'at she'arim] is absolute and precludes the 
possibility for S and B to strike a deal that effectively allows S to earn a profit in excess 
of 20%.
Whereas is permitted to commit ona'ah as long as one specifies the precise extent of the price-
discrepancy, in the specific case of foodstuffs, the rabbinical courts are required to enforce the one-
sixth law of hafka'at she'arim / hayyei nefesh even when the market participants themselves consent to 
waive it.
Quoting the Medieval commentator Rabbi Menahem ha-Meiri, Elon (2008) summarizes the 
distinction between ona'ah and hafka'at she'arim / hayyei nefesh as follows: whereas ona'ah is a Torah 
prohibition which applies to all goods (except land, slaves, bills, and consecrated property),
The law of profiteering [i.e. hafka'at she'arim / hayyei nefesh] on the other hand has its 
source in rabbinic enactment designed to prohibit the setting of prices in excess of the 
customarily accepted ones, even if the purchaser is aware of and agrees to the inflated 
price; “… even when he [the seller] says 'it cost me one sela and I want to earn two on 
it,' he has not transgressed the law of ona'ah but he is prohibited by rabbinic enactment 
[of hafka'at she'arim / hayyei nefesh] from making a profit of more than one-sixth in 
essential commodities” (Beit ha-Behirah, BM 51b).
Because hafka'at she'arim / hayyei nefesh cannot be waived, it – unlike ona'ah – definitely 
constitutes a price-control. Whereas ona'ah is designed only to protect against information asymmetry, 
hafka'at she'arim / hayyei nefesh imposes an inescapable control on prices. Indeed, Maimonides speaks 
explicitly of “appoint[ing] officers” because “the court is obligated to regulate prices” (cf. Lew 1985: 
42). Thus, Tamari concludes (1991: 68; cf. 1987: 94, 1991: 70) that “The obligation of the beit din 
[rabbinical court] to appoint officials who, in addition to their role as supervisors of weights and 
measures, will control prices of basic goods is recognized by all the codes.”
Moreover, as we saw earlier, the corporate, (relatively) democratic Jewish community possesses 
the power to regulate wages and prices independently of the beit din (rabbinical court)'s enforcement of 
the laws of ona'ah and hafka'at she'arim / hayyei nefesh. In short, while ona'ah is not a price-control, 
hafka'at she'arim / hayyei nefesh certainly is one. And the community's power to impose wage and 
price controls is exactly that.
V. The Self-Defeating Nature of Price-Controls8
As we saw, hafka'at she'arim / hayyei nefesh specifically fixes the prices of essential foodstuffs, 
suggesting that the law is meant to ensure a stable and reliable food supply especially for the poorest 
and weakest of society – particularly in times of famines and other disasters. Indeed, the hafka'at 
she'arim law does not impose price controls on luxuries which are not essential for the maintenance of 
life. According to Goldstein (2006: 447),
Jewish law ... intervenes to help the poor. For example, price controls are imposed on 
essential goods to make them affordable to the poor. Such an intervention benefits 
people ... The poor can thus benefit, together with others.
Similarly, discussing essential foodstuffs, Lew argues (1985: 184f.):
The Rabbis regarded the raising of prices above their actual value as a serious threat to 
the economic welfare of the public. … It is obvious that these rules were designed to 
control prices which would otherwise be higher and bear harshly upon the poor. … In 
any event care was taken to prevent unscrupulous merchants from taking advantage of 
the poor.
Similarly, Epstein states (1962: iv), “the prices were fixed not at individual discretion, but were 
corporately determined with a view to safeguarding the standards of life of the consumers.” Likewise, 
Warhaftig concludes (1987 s.v. “C. Summation and Application”), “there exists a measure of 
intervention and supervision designed to ensure that the lower economic classes will be able to 
purchase essential items at affordable prices.” According to Tamari (1987: 91), “The basic concern 
behind these injunctions … was the welfare of the average consumer.” And finally, Levine (2012: 93) 
states that the purpose of these laws is “to allow consumers to achieve subsistence without undue 
hardship.”
But good intentions do not ensure good consequences. The question is, are the means 
appropriate to the ends? Paradoxically, adopting price controls for necessities and allowing a free 
market for luxuries, will produce the very opposite results than what was intended. That is, price 
controls are actually an impediment to continued supply of a good, while economic freedom is the best 
guarantee that shortages will not arise. In fact, price-controls will accomplish the very opposite of what 
is intended, and tragically so. Establishing and enforcing price-controls in foodstuffs while allowing a 
free-market in luxuries will paradoxically guarantee a plentiful supply of luxuries while essentials will 
dwindle into insufficiency, exactly the situation that was sought to be avoided. One may visit 
contemporary (2016) Venezuela for an illustration.
The problem with all price controls is that prices – i.e. rates of exchange between two goods, or 
one good and money – have an essential role to play in an economy. Suppose that for some reason there 
is a surplus of mechanics and a shortage of electricians. The way the price system handles such a 
challenge is simplicity itself. The wage of mechanics falls, and that of electricians rises. This leads 
people who have attained or can attain both skills to switch from the former to the latter. Over the long-
term, students just entering trade school will tend to decide to study to become electricians instead of 
mechanics, on account of the higher wages in the former. Similarly, if there is a great demand for 
cabbage and small demand for broccoli relative to supply, the price of the former will rise and that of 
the latter, fall. This will again tend to lead entrepreneurs, as if by an “invisible hand,” to tailor their 
offerings to the wishes of consumers. The higher price of cabbage will call forth more of this vegetable, 
and the lower price of broccoli will reduce incentives to bring that product to market, at least on the 
part of all those who attempt to maximize their returns. As for those who ignore these market signals, 
all other things being equal they will tend towards bankruptcy. It is in this way that a decentralized 
market can produce a spontaneous order, functioning in a rational manner without any central direction 
at all. This may not seem important to some, but it has great importance for our welfare; no less than 
the feeding, clothing and sheltering of the persons of humanity is at stake.
Price-controls, of course, prohibit the movement of prices without government permission. But 
in the time it takes for bureaucrats to discern the relative disequilibrium of mechanics and electricians, 
or of cabbage and broccoli – to say nothing of the hundreds of thousands of other items in a modern 
economy – there is no possibility of rectifying matters sufficiently so as to attain a smoothly 
functioning economy. In this regard hafka'at she'arim / hayyei nefesh would not be a total disaster. 
Instead of preventing such price changes, it merely retards them. This Talmudic law allows prices to 
fluctuate plus or minus 20% from the official market price. If resources can be fully allocated by, say, a 
price change of only 10%, then hafka'at she'arim will have no explicit deleterious effect on the 
economy. But if full resource allocation is possible only with a price change of greater than 20%, say of 
30%, then hafka'at she'arim will restrict the change to 20% and prohibit the most efficient use of 
society's resources and will therefore restrict the potential for consumer want-satisfaction.
Profits are the means by which consumers signal to the producers and suppliers their priorities 
and preferences. Thus, profit-and-loss signals provide essential feedback in the market process (Coyne 
and Coyne 2015b: 9-12). If people come to fear they may not have enough eggs and cheese for their 
growing children, profits in egg and cheese production will rise. This will draw increasing investments 
into this industry – for investors seek profit opportunities – and draw investments away from 
competing industries. The increased investment will spur additional production in eggs and cheese, and 
production will be reduced in competing industries for which demand is less urgent and from which 
investment was withdrawn. But if the government artificially limits profits, this process will be 
frustrated according to the extent of the intervention. Price-controls serve like a perverse warning sign 
to the entrepreneur and investor. In the absence of controls, he had looked upon all investment 
opportunities on an equal basis, focusing on the items which people demonstrated were most important 
to them, so as to maximize his own returns by serving the customers to their own satisfaction. But now, 
with price-controls and profit limitations, he will tend to avoid these options. There will be economic 
perversity as a consequence. Whereas in a free-market, resources flowed away from industries 
producing less urgently-required resources and towards industries producing essentials, once price-
controls are imposed on essentials, the very opposite will occur. Resources will flow away from 
industries producing necessities, where they are most needed, and towards luxuries, where they are not. 
Given the presumed goal of the Rabbis, the mandate to impose regulation on necessities and to allow 
freedom for luxuries is the very opposite of what will best serve the community. Given the Rabbis' 
goals, then if we absolutely must have government interference in the economy, it would be far better 
to control extravagant items and to leave essentials strictly alone. Were price-controls to be imposed on 
luxuries and a free-market allowed in essentials, then investment would flow away from luxuries and 
towards essentials, and the goals of the Rabbis would be better accomplished.
One might object that all this is true only in the long-term, when production can adjust to new 
prices. Perhaps in the short-term, price-controls are actually beneficial for assisting the poor weather 
the adverse conditions. In the short-term, supply is relatively fixed – the supply curve is a vertical line – 
and so supply cannot adjust to prices anyway. However, price-controls are self-defeating in the short-
term as well, due to their effect on demand. Whereas the quantity supplied will increase in the long-
term in response to an increase in price, it is equally true that quantity demanded will decrease in the 
short-term in response to that same increase in price. In other words, prices serve to ration scarce 
supplies in the short-term by modulating demand. For example, suppose a famine has struck and there 
is only a small quantity of grain left. If the price is allowed to remain at its customary level, then 
consumers will continue to consume the same quantity of grain as they have before, unless strict 
rationing measures are imposed, such as establishing quotas or requiring rationing coupons in addition 
to money. Furthermore, the first people to arrive at the marketplace will be in a privileged position to 
purchase all the available grain, leaving nothing for late-comers. Furthermore, because people are 
interested in buying more grain at below-market prices than can be accommodated, sellers of grain 
know they may indulge their own preferences and biases, selling favoritistically. For example, if people 
wish to buy more grain than is available, the seller will be in a position to refuse to sell to religious or 
ethnic minorities without sacrificing any profits. In other words, below-market prices lead to queues, 
and queues in turn tend to favor early-comers at the expense of late-comers, or else allow sellers to 
indulge their biases and even bigotry. But if the price of grain is allowed to rise in response to the 
shortage induced by the famine, then consumers will consume less grain in the short-term, stretching 
out the limited supply over a longer period until enough time has passed that supply can increase in 
response to the higher price. Queues will disappear, and thus consumers will be in a more equitable 
position relative to one another. 
Therefore, not only are price-controls disastrous for their effect in reducing quantity supplied, 
but they cause equal damage in increasing quantity demanded, compared to the lesser quantity which 
would be demanded if the price were allowed to increase to its new market level. Price-controls 
established in times of privation and famine thus serve to harm the very people they are intended to 
help in not one but two ways, like Marshall's analogy of the two blades of a scissors: when supplies are 
short, price-controls reduce the quantity supplied and increase the quantity demanded relative to what 
they would be in a free-market, thus making the famine or disaster doubly insufferable. The 
consequences of price-controls, therefore, are never what they aim to be, but instead, they produce 
queues (Coyne and Coyne 2015b: 19), black markets (Coyne and Coyne 2015b: 20), and product 
quality deterioration (Coyne and Coyne 2015b: 20). Price-controls even promote discrimination (Coyne 
and Coyne 2015b: 20, Levine 2012: 193). Ordinarily, a person can indulge in their racist or sexist – or 
otherwise discriminatory – preferences only by suffering a reduction to their profits. For example, if 
markets are clearing and supply equals demand, a person cannot refuse to sell to ethnic minorities 
unless they are willing to lose a substantial portion of their customer base. In fact, railroad firms 
lobbied against Jim Crow for precisely this reason (Gorman 2008 quoting Roback 1986). But when 
minimum prices cause quantity demanded to exceed quantity supplied, discriminators can afford to 
indulge their preferences. If there are already more customers than there are supplies to sell them, then 
the seller loses little by deciding to sell only to favored ethnicities. Thus, price-controls have several 
negative consequences aside from their simple promotion of surpluses and shortages.
VI. Aaron Levine's Interpretation
According to Aaron Levine, however, hafka'at she'arim is not a price-control at all. Being both 
a rabbi as well as an academic economist, Levine was specially situated to appeciate the significance of 
the hafka'at she'arim law, and he understood how damaging it would be to the Jewish religion if 
hafka'at she'arim suffered from the typical failures of price controls. Therefore, he was forced to argue 
that hafka'at she'arim is different from other price controls. We devote this section to closely examining 
Levine's defense of the hafka'at she'arim law.9 We shall conclude that his defense is unconvincing, and 
that hafka'at she'arim remains a harmful price-control after all.
According to an early statement by Levine (1985a: 424),
Raising price on the basis of an upward shift of the demand curve is regarded in Jewish 
law as unethical when the shift is rooted in a changed circumstance, e.g. war, which 
makes the consumer's need for the product desperate. Similarly unethical is the raising 
of a price when the shift is due to an artificially created need by dint of religious law.
Unfortunately, Levine has confused a rightward (or upward) shift of the demand curve with a leftward 
(or upward) shift of the supply curve. Warfare does not increase demand but rather it decreases supply. 
It is not that people wish to eat more food in wartime than they used to consume in peacetime; it is 
rather that war makes food harder to come by at any given price. Invading armies of the time lacked 
supply lines, and they sustained themselves from the fields. They may have also burned whatever they 
could not consume themselves. Therefore, the supply of all crops at a given price would have shifted 
left, becoming more scarce. Now, it is true that demand will shift right (towards urgency) as consumers 
speculatively anticipate a future rise in prices due to the supply shock. In other words, consumers will 
be willing to spend more for a given quantity of food in the present because they anticipate that prices 
will rise in the future because of the war. But this rightward shift in demand is in response to the 
anticipated leftward shift in supply. Therefore, the principal effect of warfare is a leftward supply 
shock, and the rightward shift in demand is merely a secondary response to that supply shock. Levine 
has somehow neglected the primary shift in supply and focused on the secondary shift in demand. 
In any case, however, Levine has failed to realize that a price-control in this situation will be 
self-defeating and harm the very people it is meant to help. When warfare has caused a decrease in the 
supply of essential goods, prices must be allowed to increase for two reasons: first, to call forth an 
increase in supply, and second, to reduce quantity demanded and allocate the limited supply that 
remains. If, on the contrary, a price-control is imposed, then there will be no incentive for suppliers to 
alleviate the privation and consumers will consume too much and fail to economize the limited supply. 
Similarly, it is economically irrelevant whether a shift in consumer demand is artificially created by 
religious law; regardless of the cause of the shift, any restriction on the free movement of prices will 
create negative consequences which harm the very people whom the law intends to help. Thus, Levine 
is completely wrong to argue that a price-control in a situation of scarcity or shortage “would not really 
impose much of a problem in terms of resource allocation” (1985b: 447).
In his latest writing (2012), Levine's argument is far more sophisticated. Levine notes from the 
outset of his analysis that price-controls are self-defeating (2012: 22, 93-95, 110). He recognizes that 
prices serve as signals (Levine 2012: 93) directing the allocation of resources (Levine 2012: 94), and 
that profits serve the same function as well (Levine 2012: 94). Price-controls will generally result in 
shortages, black markets, and the necessity for rationing (Levine 2012: 94). Furthermore, price-controls 
discourage new entry by alternate suppliers (Levine 2012: 94). Concerning wages in particular, Levine 
recognizes that where minimum wages or mandatory union membership drive wages above the market-
clearing rate, employers will reduce their demand for employees, producing permanent unemployment 
(Levine 2012: 191-193, 209; cf. Siebert 2015). Ironically, then, the minimum wage hurts the very 
people it is meant to meant to help, producing self-defeating consequences (Levine 2012: 191-193, 
209). For this reason and others as well, Aaron Levine argues that Jewish law would reject any form of 
minimum wage (Levine 2012: 191-210). Recognizing that the minimum wage must be rejected along 
with all other price-controls, he attempts to show that the profit-limitation of hafka'at she'arim is not a 
price-control at all. 
In Levine's interpretation (2012: 106), “the rabbis set the price ceiling above the equilibrium 
price” (cf. Levine 2012: 107, 110, 111). But the price ceiling is not the price which the rabbis enforce. 
As Levine says (2012: 107, 111),10 “Because the price ceiling is a matter of public knowledge, some 
may, however, erroneously regard it as a mandated price.” In fact, sellers are not bound by the rabbinic 
price ceiling but rather by the equilibrium status quo market price. “It is the role of these supervisors to 
survey the marketplace and make sure that no one sells above the competitive norm” (Levine 2012: 
107; cf. 2012: 111). If the sellers are bound, not by the rabbinic price ceiling but rather by the 
competitive market price, then what function does the rabbinic price ceiling serve? Levine answers that 
“the usefulness of setting a price ceiling is that it signals the rabbis when remedial measures should be 
put in place … [including] a rationing system” (Levine 2012: 107, 111),11 to be implemented after the 
market price has increased such that “the price ceiling becomes the competitive norm” (Levine 2012: 
107, 111).12 In other words, sellers are bound by the competitive market price itself, and the price 
commissioners of the court enforce that market price, not the price ceiling. The function of the price 
ceiling is only to serve as a signal. Once the market price increases to the point that it equals or exceeds 
the price ceiling, then further interventions become warranted, including non-price rationing (cf. 
Levine 1985a: 423). For Levine, the market price is to be allowed to freely fluctuate, but if supply 
shocks (Levine 2012: 107) cause the competitive market rate to increase to the point that it reaches the 
official price ceiling, this will serve as a signal for the beit din (rabbinical court) to institute non-market 
rationing schemes. Furthermore, this mechanism is to be coupled with the communal institution of 
wage and price controls (Levine 2012: 108, 111), which may conflict with and supersede the hayyei 
nefesh ordinance (Levine 2012: 108). The purpose of these controls is to eliminate economic rents and 
profits (1985a: 423; 1985b: 448f.; 2012: 109, 112).
But there are a few problems with Levine's interpretation: first, there is still a system of price-
controls, only the price which is enforced is not the official price declared by the beit din, but rather the 
alleged competitive market rate. In other words, there is a sort of terminological dispute about what to 
call the price that is enforced, but there is still some price that is enforced. The entire purpose of 
Levine's interpretation was to deny that the Talmud imposed price-controls, for he admitted that price-
controls are self-defeating (Levine 2012: 22, 93-95, 110). But after all his efforts, his interpretation still 
results in there being a price-control, only the price which the courts enforce is not the official price 
promulgated by the courts, but rather, the courts enforce what they perceive to be the status quo market 
price. Either way, a price-control is still being enforced. A price-control is still a price-control 
regardless of whether the price that is enforced is an officially promulgated price or whether it is the 
preexisting status quo market price from which future deviations are prohibited. If deviations from the 
status quo market price are prohibited, then this still constitutes a price-control with all its attendant 
negative effects. If market conditions change such that the equilibrium market-clearing price changes 
but the status quo market price continues to be enforced, then the market will be unable to clear, and 
there will be economic misallocations and dislocations. Furthermore, in his interpretation, once the 
market price rises to equal the official price, at that point, the court is supposed to institute non-price-
rationing, which means there is still a price-control. Moreover, Levine says that all this is to be coupled 
with communal wage and price controls. So all Levine has done is to replace one form of price-control 
with another.
Second, it is difficult to understand how the market price could ever rise to meet the official 
price-ceiling if the commissioners punish every deviation from the market price. Levine is remarkably 
unaware of the contradiction between his statements. On the one hand, he says, “It is the role of these 
supervisors to survey the marketplace and make sure that no one sells above the competitive norm” 
(Levine 2012: 107; cf. 2012: 111). On the other hand, he argues for remedial measures to be 
implemented after the market price has increased such that “the price ceiling becomes the competitive 
norm” (Levine 2012: 107, 111). But how are prices to rise if sellers are bound by the status quo market 
prices?13 As we noted, enforcement of the status quo market price is still a price-control. Suppose the 
market price is today $10 and the official price-ceiling is $20 (following Levine's interpretation that the 
two differ). When the market price rises to $20, Levine would say, this would serve as a signal to the 
court to take remedial action, including rationing (Levine 2012: 107).14 But how is the market price to 
rise from $10 to $20 if the first merchant to charge $12 (deviating more than one-sixth from $10) is 
immediately punished and forced to sell at $11 (within one-sixth)? If every significant deviation from 
the market price is immediately prevented, how will the market price ever change? 
Perhaps Levine assumes the price will change only gradually, from $10 to $11 to $12, etc., $1 at 
a time, until it finally reaches $20, instead of going straight from $10 to $20. Starting with a price of 
$10, then one may charge $11.67, i.e. 1/6 more than $10. Then, when all of one's competitors begin to 
charge $11.67 as well, so that this new price becomes the general price, one may charge 1/6 more than 
that, or $13.60. This process will continue until one finally reaches $20, the efficient market-clearing 
price which was desired all along. But if an increase from $10 to $20 is necessary to achieve market-
clearing equilibrium, then the last thing we want is to delay that transition by forcing it to be gradual, 
compelling the price-transition to proceed by proportions of 1/6. The faster the transition is made, the 
less painful it will be and the fewer economic disruptions and dislocations it will cause. If the current 
market price is $10 and some alert entrepreneur realizes that the market will clear only at $20, then we 
want him to be able to immediately charge $20. We do not want him to have to first charge $11.67, then 
wait until all his competitors charge $11.67 too (so that $11.67 becomes the new market price), and 
then charge $13.60, etc., repeating this tedious process until $20. There appears to be no theoretical 
economic reason why such a gradual transition would be desirable. At the very least, the burden of 
proof lies with Levine to justify such gradualism.
Nor did Levine ever indicate that he had such a gradual transition in mind in his statement that 
the price-level would be permitted to change even as deviations from it were simultaneously 
prohibited. Instead, it appears more likely that Levine was not even aware of the contradiction in his 
statements. Levine apparently relied on a perfectly competitive, static-equilibrium conception of price 
theory, whereby the general market rate of prices changes according to the actions of a mythical 
Walrasian auctioneer without any individual market participant ever having changed his own prices. 
According to the theory of perfect competition, every market participant is a price-taker rather than a 
price-maker, and no individual market participant is responsible for changing the general price-level. 
But then who does change the price-level? According to the static conception, the price changes itself 
without any human input. But according to theory of the market as a “process” (Kirzner 1997), the 
general price-level can change only as a result of individual market participants changing their prices, 
one-by-one. The general price level will change from $10 to $20 when merchants individually change 
the prices they charge, in response to individually changing perceptions of relative supply and demand 
by different market participants.
If the Talmud – like Levine – assumed a static-equilibrium model of a general price-level that 
changes without any individual market participants changing their prices, then hafka'at she'arim would 
definitely be a price-control – contrary to Levine's interpretation – for the court commissioners would 
have to ban every deviation from the market price by individual merchants and thus prevent the price 
from ever changing. The market would be allowed to change its own prices, but no human agency 
would be permitted to do this. Only the mythical Walrasian auctioneer would be permitted to alter 
prices, and any individual who attempted to preempt the market by changing his own prices first, 
would be punished by the court's market inspectors. Levine's attempt to show that hafka'at she'arim is 
not a price-control will have failed. At best, prices would be permitted to change only gradually, in the 
manner which we have indicated, from $10 to $11.67 to $13.60, but without passing directly from $10 
to the market-clearing rate of $20. Interpreted in this way, hafka'at she'arim would not constitute a pure 
price-control, but it would nevertheless put a brake on economic adjustments and unnecessarily prolong 
the agony of economic disequilibrium. 
But if the Talmud understood the market as a “process” (Kirzner), then the Talmud would have 
understood that the general price-level changes if and only if individual merchants change their prices. 
In that case, allowing the general price-level to change necessarily presumes that merchants have 
freedom to charge whatever prices they wish. If this is the case, then the Talmud could not have 
intended what Levine argues it did, namely that the commissioners were to ban individual merchants 
from deviating from the market price at the same time that the general price-level was to be allowed to 
somehow fluctuate until it reached the official price. Either the Talmud assumed that the market is a 
dynamic process, and Levine's interpretation of the Talmud is untenable; or else the Talmud assumed 
static-equilibrium, and hafka'at she'arim is indeed a price-control, contrary to Levine's claim. Or it is 
possible that the purpose of the law was to prolong economic adjustment by forcing price changes to be 
unnecessarily gradual and step-wise, in which case Levine has failed once again to prove hafka'at 
she'arim is not a price-control. In any case, it is not clear what Levine intends, and every interpretation 
reduces to some sort of price-control or another. Furthermore, Levine ultimately appeals to the 
community to impose wage and price controls outside the scope of hafka'at she'arim, so his attempt to 
defend the Talmud from the claim that it permits price-controls, must necessarily fail.
Interestingly, Levine assumes that the law of hafka'at she'arim is no longer legally binding, but 
he never specifies the legal mechanism by which this law has been annulled. He states (2012: 109, 
112):15
What survives is not the 20% figure per se. This figure made sense only for the 
marketplace and economic conditions that existed at the time of the enactment of the 
ordinance. The general objection to “excessive profits” for those who deal in essential 
products should, however, remain. What should be substituted for the 20% figure today 
is the notion that the ideal is to craft government tax and regulatory policy to eliminate 
economic rents in the hayyei nefesh [essential foodstuffs] sector. In other words, the goal 
should be to prevent profits in this sector from exceeding opportunity cost earnings.16
What Levine means by “opportunity cost earnings” is that no merchant should be allowed to earn more 
selling foodstuffs than he could earn in any alternative employment or occupation. In other words, the 
merchant should be allowed to earn just enough to convince him to remain a merchant, but not more. 
Unfortunately, Levine's scheme of taxing profits above opportunity costs to eliminate rents is not any 
better than the original price-control which he sought to avoid. As we showed earlier, profits and losses 
are essential signals to investors and producers. Profits motivate new entry while losses inspire exit. 
Taxing excess profits would therefore deter new entry, as Levine himself says (2012: 94). For example, 
if a famine has struck a land and the price of food has skyrocketed, the excess profits will encourage 
foreign suppliers to divert their food supply from their own domestic market where profits are normal, 
to the famine-stricken market where profits are excess. If suppliers are forbidden to earn higher profits 
in the famine-stricken market than in their own local market, then they will have no incentive to export 
supplies to alleviate the famine. Why export food just so you can earn the same return as if you had 
sold it locally? Levine's scheme of taxing excess profits would thus disrupt the price-mechanism and 
create disorder in the market, just like any other price-control. All prices communicate essential 
information and price-signals alone efficiently promote economic coordination. There is no scientific 
way to declare that a profit is excessive or detrimental to the consumer. Profit-and-loss signals provide 
feedback which is essential to the healthy and effective operation of the market process (Coyne and 
Coyne 2015b: 9-12). 
Levine's eror is especially puzzling because he himself correctly pointed out how essential 
profits are for coordination and signaling (Levine 2012: 94) and that price-controls are therefore self-
defeating (Levine 2012: 110). Hence, it is not clear why Levine considers it desirable to eliminate 
profits. Perhaps it is because in Neoclassical static-equilibrium analysis, “above-normal profit is taken 
as an indicator of monopoly, and evidence of an inefficient allocation of resources” (Holcombe 2014: 
388; cf. DiLorenzo 1988: 321f. and Pasour 1987: 124-126). But as Holcombe has pointed out (2014: 
390, 400), 
profit is a sign of increased efficiency in the allocation of resources, not a sign of 
inefficiency. Consider this even within a comparative static framework. If one starts 
with the situation in which all markets are in equilibrium and there are no economic 
profits, and then an entrepreneur introduces an innovation into the market that generates 
economic profits, that profit will be the result of either an innovation that lowers the cost 
of production of the entrepreneur’s output, or produces a good or service that purchasers 
value more than the alternatives previously available. Either way, the profit is an 
indication that resources are being allocated more efficiently than before, and welfare 
has increased. . . . Above-normal profits indicate a welfare loss within a static 
framework, because using competitive equilibrium as a benchmark for efficiency, the 
firm making above-normal profit is doing so by producing an inefficiently low quantity 
to maintain that profit. However, when profit is the result of innovation, a competitive 
industry is the wrong benchmark, because the output would not have been produced 
were it not for the lure of future profit. 
In general, profits are a signal and an incentive for entrepreneurs to cut costs and introduce innovations 
which will benefit consumers (Holcombe 2014, Coyne and Coyne 2015b: 9-12.). Therefore, 
eliminating profits will remove the incentive for innovation and cost-cutting. Hence, it is not clear why 
we would want to follow Levine in eliminating economic rents and taxing excess profits.17 Perhaps 
what Levine meant is that excess profits should be taxed only in the case of monopoly (cf. Levine 
2012: 95) but not in the case of above-normal returns for successful entrepreneurship and innovation. If 
so, then this would bring us into the field of the theory of monopoly, which is beyond this article's 
scope.18 In any case, while Levine recognizes that price-controls are self-defeating, his attempts to 
show that hafka'at she'arim / hayyei nefesh does not constitute a price-control fails because every one 
of his interpretations ultimately reduces to some form of price-control or another. 
Levine's treatment of the minimum wage is similarly disappointing, for once again, he 
uncritically endorses the community's dangerous power to impose arbitrary wage and price controls. As 
we saw earlier, Levine rejects the minimum wage and mandatory union membership because they will 
cause permanent unemployment, hurting the very people they are meant to help (2012: 191-210). 
Instead, Levine argues that the democratic community ought to exercise its ability to regulate wages 
and prices in order to judge certain contracts as unconscionable – for example, a private employment 
contract stipulating that the employee is forbidden to seek additional employment on the side even 
though the employee's wage is insufficient to live on (Levine 2012: 202-204). Thus, Levine recognizes 
and endorses the community's power to arbitrarily regulate prices and wages, but he trusts that the 
community will exercise this power only in ways which he as an economist approves. 
Now, let us suppose for the sake of argument that such a contract nullification would indeed 
have no negative effects. Unfortunately, Levine nowhere indicates what would constitutionally 
constrain the democratic community to use its power only in such economically responsible ways. It is 
not enough to argue that the community ought to limit the exercise of its own power. Such a mere 
warning without institutional safeguards will turn out to be impotent. As Lord Acton famously declared 
(1887), “All power tends to corrupt; absolute power corrupts absolutely.” Therefore, Thomas Jefferson 
declared (1798), “In questions of powers, then, let no more be heard of confidence in man, but bind 
him down from mischief by the chains of the Constitution.” And as James Madison warned (1788), “In 
framing a government which is to be administered by men over men, the great difficulty lies in this: 
you must first enable the government to control the governed; and in the next place oblige it to control 
itself.” 
Unfortunately, Levine gives no indication of any constitutional restrictions on the democratic 
community's power to impose wage-controls. He wishes for the community to use its power 
responsibly only to nullify unconscionable contracts, but he gives no reason to believe that the 
community, having been granted this unlimited power, will indeed exercise it responsibly. In reality, 
voters are not only “rationally ignorant,” but they are often “rationally irrational,” voting 
“expressively” based on what makes them feel good or what satisfies their consciences (Caplan 2007, 
Pennington 2011: 65-69). It is easy to imagine the electorate of the Jewish community voting to impose 
wage-controls, idealistically – but wrongly – believing that this will improve the welfare of the poor. 
Consider Epstein's (1962: vi) endorsement of the community's power to regulate wages:
Property did not give owners the right to hire workers on their own terms. The wages 
were fixed with a view to safeguarding the workers’ standard of life by the authorities, 
who drew up regulations as to the wages and hours of labour and other rights of the 
workers.
Epstein sees nothing objectionable about arbitrary wage controls. Levine, recognizing the existence of 
this power, wishes for it to be used only to nullify unconscionable contracts, not to arbitrarily regulate 
wages as Epstein wants. But we are given no assurance that the Jewish community will always heed 
Levine rather than Epstein in its exercise of its absolute power. Thus, Levine recognizes that the power 
to control wages control is harmful and dangerous unless used only to nullify unconscionable contracts, 
but he recognizes no institutional safeguards against the abuse of democratic power to control all wages 
whatsoever. He endorses the community's unlimited power to control wages, naively trusting that this 
power will not be used inconsistently with the counself of academic economists. But a robust political 
system cannot trust in blind faith that the right people will be in power. Robust political economy 
means ensuring tolerably good results even under adverse, sub-optimal conditions (Pennington 2011). 
An unconstrained democratic power to impose wage and price-controls fails to satisfy this criterion. 
Perhaps a corollary of Murphy's Law is in order: if power – even democratic power – can be abused, it 
will be.
VII. Are these Laws Still in Force? Possible Resolutions.
We have now seen that while ona'ah is not a price-control, enforcement of hafka'at she'arim / 
hayyei nefesh is a self-defeating price-control. Likewise, the community's power to democratically 
impose wage and price controls would be economically self-defeating as well. The question is, what if 
anything can be done about these issues? According to several authors, the prohibition of ona'ah is no 
longer legally binding because in a modern, free economy, there is no such thing as the “true” price of a 
good anymore (Shilo and Elon 2008; Warhaftig 1988 s.v. “G. Contemporary Application”, end of 
section“C. Exceptions”). Perhaps the same applies to the law of hafka'at she'arim / hayyei nefesh as 
well, which similarly  prohibits deviations of 1/6 from the price. If ona'ah cannot be enforced because 
there is no such thing as a “true” price from which deviations of 1/6 are prohibited, then the same ought 
to be true of hafka'at she'arim / hayyei nefesh. Indeed, we saw that Levine states (2012: 109, 112) that 
“What survives is not the 20% figure per se. This figure made sense only for the marketplace and 
economic conditions that existed at the time of the enactment of the ordinance.” And according to 
Warhaftig (1988: end of sec. “C. Exceptions”), “in most cases today it is impossible to establish a 
market price.” Furthermore, he states (ibid. s.v. “G. Contemporary Applications”) that “in a completely 
free market, where every merchant has his own price[, t]here is is no market price, and therefore no 
ona'ah.” Elon makes the same argument (Shilo and Elon 2008). And if the nonexistence of a “true” 
price nullifies the prohibition of ona'ah, the same ought to be true of hafka'at she'arim / hayyei nefesh. 
This analogy is made easier by the fact that whereas ona'ah is a Torah-prohibition, hafka'at she'arim is 
merely Rabbinic (Elon 2008, Warhaftig 1988: s.v. “F. Fraud...”). Rabbinic laws are considered to carry 
less authority than Torah laws, and so nullifying a Rabbinic law is easier than nullifying a Torah law.
Furthermore, Elon (2008) states, “the rules concerning profiteering were only to take effect if 
imposed as measures of general application to all vendors, otherwise the individual could not be 
obliged to adhere to the permitted maximum rate of profit.” Similarly, according to Warhaftig (1987: 
end of sec. “4. Profit Limitation”), “a merchant is obligated to abide by this law only if there is a 
supervisory mechanism to insure that all merchants conform to its provisions. If, however, the market 
is unregulated one does not have to sell cheaper than others.” The idea seems to be that a merchant 
does not have to hamstring himself by abiding by these laws if his competitors are not. If any part of 
the market is unregulated, then the merchants in the regulated sector are not obligated to abide by the 
regulations either, lest they face competitive disadvantage. But in this era of globalization, the relevant 
market seems to be the world market. Therefore, it would not be enough for the State of Israel 
(Medinat Yisrael) to enforce hafka'at she'arim in the land of Israel (Eretz Yisrael), because the 
inhabitants of the rest of the world remain unregulated. If these laws were enforced in Israel, then 
domestic Israeli commerce would face international competitive disadvantage. And as long as the rest 
of the world is not regulated by the Talmud's laws, then the market per se is not regulated by the 
Talmud either. Since the relevant market today is the world market, then the whole world must be 
regulated by the Talmud's laws in order for the Talmud's economic regulations to be binding for Jews in 
Israel. If the non-Jewish world does not enforce these halakhic regulations, then apparently, no Jew is 
obligated to abide by them either. In an era of global trade, domestic interventionist regulations are 
liable to backfire even worse than in a closed domestic economy. And becaise tariffs and other forms of 
protectionism lead to monopoly and reduced consumer welfare, such regulations ought not be imposed 
in the first place. Assuming the State of Israel permits international free-trade as it ought to, then the 
State of Israel and the religious Jewish courts (batei din) ought not enforce the Talmud's regulations, 
lest Israeli merchants face competitive disadvantage from foreigners who are not so restricted.
However, none of this would help us account for communally-imposed price-controls. Because 
these laws have no reference to the 1/6 fraction with respect to the “true” price of a good, we cannot say 
that these laws are no longer binding on account of the nonexistence of such a price. Luckily, the 
corporate community's power to impose wage and price controls appears to be moribund and in 
desuetude, simply because modern Jewish communities are not constituted as they once were, as 
politically independent, sovereign bodies (Menachem Friedman 1982, 1986, 1993, 2004; cf. Tamari 
1991: 15). Today, the locales where Orthodox Jews live tend to have a multiplicity of competing rabbis 
and rabbinical courts, and none of them has the sort of territorial monopoly on the legitimate use of 
force which would be necessary to impose wage and price controls. Furthermore, the communities are 
so localized that it is likely that any attempt to impose the controls would become a self-evident failure. 
Imagine, for example, a synagogue in New York City attempting to dictate that every one of its 
congregants must pay half the going rate for food and must work for at least double the going rate of 
wages. This synagogue's members would immediately find themselves unable to purchase food or find 
employment in a competitive marketplace. Any Orthodox Jew who told the local supermarket that he is 
only allowed to pay half the going rate for food, or who told his employer that he must be paid double 
the going wage-rate for his occupation, would be laughed at, and it is unlikely that any synagogue 
would attempt to enforce such a decree. If the synagogue tried, the congregants would probably all vote 
with their feet (Tiebout sorting) and begin attending a competing synagogue which allowed them to 
purchase food and to find employment at the going market rates. Therefore, jurisdictional competition 
in the modern world has probably nullified the communal price-controls. Nevertheless, we should 
admit that once upon a time, when the Jewish communities were sovereign, the imposition of wage and 
price controls was politically possible and yet economically self-defeating. The communal controls 
may lie in desuetude today, but we should admit that when they were effective, they were based on 
erroneous economic science. If it ever becomes politically feasible to enforce these communal price-
controls again, we should be ready to criticize that power immediately.
Finally, there is one general solution to these problems which may prove useful. While Jewish 
tradition holds the Talmudic sages received a tradition of Jewish law that dates back to the revelation at 
Sinai – the Torah She'be'al Pe (“Oral Law”) – and which was embodied in the Talmud, there is also a 
tradition – albeit less universally accepted – that this Sinaitic Oral Law did not include scientific 
knowledge (Talmud, Pesahim 94b, quoted in Levi 2006 [1983]: 223f. and in Hirsch n.d.: 21, cited in 
Angel 2008: 16; Sherira Gaon, Otzar ha-Geonim, Gittin 68, par. 376, quoted in Levi 2006 [1983]: 223 
and in Student 2001; Maimonides, Moreh Nevukhim, pt. 3, end of ch. 14, quoted in Levi 2006 [1983]: 
223 and in Student 2001; Avraham ben ha-Rambam in Glick 1916: vii; Hirsch in Breuer 1975, Hirsch 
n.d.: 19, and Levi 2006 [1983]: 225; Haim David Halevy, Asei Lekha Rav 5:49, quoted in Angel 2008: 
16; Schachter 2014; Student 2001; Lew 1985: 3; cf. Student 2014). According to this view, the 
Talmudic sages combined their Sinaitic legal traditions with whatever knowledge of contemporary, 
secular science they possessed, to arrive at practical legal decisions. Therefore, their practical legal 
decisions could prove to be incorrect insofar as they were based – in good faith – on inaccurate 
scientific knowledge of the time. According to many – not all – contemporary Jewish legal authorities, 
it is sometimes – not always – permissible or even mandatory to change Jewish law whenever it is 
discovered that the scientific knowledge on which the law was based, is not accurate (Schachter 2014, 
Student 2001, Levi 2006 [1983]: 228; for the contrary view of Maimonides, see Buchman 2007, 
Glasner 1921, Student 2001). However, whether any particular halakhah can be altered in accordance 
with new scientific discoveries depends on the precise relationship between the specific halakhah in 
question and the related scientific principle; whether the halakhah may be modified must be decided on 
a case-by-case basis (Schachter 2014, Student 2001, Levi 2006 [1983]: 228). Therefore, we cannot 
simply state categorically that all these halakhic economic regulations were definitely based on ancient, 
inaccurate understandings of economics; nor can we automatically conclude that these halakhot may be 
summarily abolished. But we can state that it is possible that these halakhot may be abolished on this 
basis. This deserves further study.
VIII. Conclusion
Thus, we have seen that the halakhah's economic regulations, like all forms of price-control, 
would tend to be inefficient if enforced and would tend to accomplish the very opposite of their 
intention. While ona'ah may have only been intended to protect against asymmetric information, the 
hafka'at she'arim / hayyei nefesh ordinance definitely constitutes a self-defeating price-control on 
essential foodstuffs. And the community's power to impose wage and price controls cannot be 
explained anyway as being anything but a similarly self-defeating price-control. Aaron Levine's attempt 
to defend hayyei nefesh as being something other than a price-control is unconvincing. We have 
demonstrated that positive (value-free) science may contradict religion, not only in the realm of 
cosmology and biology, but even in the area of economics.
But it may be the case that the law of hafka'at she'arim / hayyei nefesh is no longer applicable to 
a modern marketplace, and therefore, it may be no cause for concern. If so, then the matter may rest 
there. Meanwhile, the corporate Jewish community luckily appears to no longer possess the legal or 
political authority to exercise its power to impose wage and price controls, but we should still criticize 
that theoretical power in case the community ever regains its authority. In all these cases, it is possible 
but not guaranteed, that some of these laws may be able to be abolished or nullified on the grounds that 
they were based, not on Sinaitic legal tradition, but on then-contemporary scientific understanding 
which has proven to be inaccurate. 
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